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Pritchett v. Commonwealth
557 S.E.2d 205 (Va. 2002)
L Facts
Estel Darnell Singleton ("Singleton") was found shot in the head at the
Ironto Rest Stop on April 30, 1997. Singleton's wallet and other personal items
were found strewn around his body, but his ATM card was missing from his
person. Police learned from the bank that an individual had attempted to use the
AIM card and that the bank had a video of this person. A police investigator
viewed the tape and recognized the individual as Livingston Pritchett, III
("Pritchett').'
The investigator recognized and was familiar with Pritchett because he had
recently been a witness in another murder case. Under the pretext of discussing
this prior case further, the police lured Pritchett to the State Police Headquarters
in Salem where, after some initial friendliness, the police began questioning
Pritchett about Singleton's murder. Pritchett initially denied knowing about the
incident. However, under further questioning, Pritchett told the police that he
and Singleton had gotten into a struggle when the gun was accidentally fired,
killing Singleton.!
Pritchett was indicted in Montgomery County for capital murder, robbery,
use of a firearm during a felony, and use of a firearm during a robbery. During
the guilt phase of the trial, the Commonwealth introduced into evidence the
incriminating statement made by Pritchett to the police. Pritchett testified in
contradiction to this alleged confession.'
At trial Pritchett sought to introduce the testimony of two experts to
challenge the reliabilityof the statement introduced bythe Commonwealth.4 The
Commonwealth objected to Pritchett's evidence on the grounds that it was
inadmissible because Pritchett had not pleaded insanityand the testimonywould
go to Pritchett's mental state at the time of the crime and further, that the experts
had been appointed onlyto assist the defendant with mitigation evidence during
the sentencing phase.' Pritchett continued to assert that the proffered evidence
1. Prirchett v. Commonweakh, 557 S.E.2d 205, 206 (Va. 2002).
2. Id at 206-07.
3. Id
4. Id at 207.
5. Id at 207; swa/so Appendix at 118-19, Pritchett v. Comuonwealth, 557 S.E.2d 205 (Va.
2002) (No. 010030). The Supreme Court of Virginia noted that this argument was incorrect but
that on appeal, the Commonweakh corrected the error and stated that the testimony was directed
at Pritchett's mental state at the time of his confession and not at the time of the act. P]izdxr 557
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was merelyto guide the juryas to the weight it should give to the alleged confes-
sion. 6
The court refused to admit the expert testimony on the basis that "such
testimony would invade the province of the jury."7 None of the testimony by
either expert was heard by the jury. The jury convicted Pritchett of four of-
fenses, including first degree murder.9 The jury recommended that Pritchett be
sentenced to life for the murder charge and an additional thirteen years for the
other charges.'0 Pritchett then moved for a mistrial based on the exclusion of the
experts, which the court denied; he also renewed all of his motions, upon which
the court renewed all of its rulings."
Pritchett appealed several issues to the Court of Appeals of Virginia,
including the exclusion of the expert testimony. 2  The court held that the
proffered expert testimonywas an opinion going directlyto "whether the defen-
dant's denial of making a confession was true,. .. [it was] a comment on the
defendant's credibility," and therefore, because the admission of the evidence was
soundly committed to the discretion of the trial court, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion." The court affirmed the trial court.' Pritchett appealed
several issues to the Supreme Court of Virginia. s
I. Hdding
The Supreme Court of Virginia only "considered the admissibility of
proffered expert opinions concerning the mental retardation of the defendant
and the susceptibilityof mentallyretarded persons to suggestive police interroga-
tion."6 The court held that the experts' testimony should have been admitted
because it was evidence relevant to the reliability of Pritchett's confession.'7
Further, the court held that this error was not harmless, and remanded the case
for a new trial.8
SX.2d at 208 n.*.
6. Id at 207; swabo Appendix at 120, Pritdw (No. 010030).
7. P i 557 S.E2d at 208.
8. Id at 207.
9. Id at 206.
10. Id
11. Id; see alo Appendix at 179-90, P&Slaw (No. 010030).
12. Pfjrxnt 557 S.E2d at 206.
13. Appendix at 204-05, Pnk (No. 010030).
14. Id at 206. One judge dissented, finding that the evidence should have been admitted
because mental retardation is outside the knowledge range of the normal jury. Id at 223.
15. /Nt. 557 SE.2d at 206.
16. Id




MI. A nmbas /Aplian mi
Specifically, the evidence in question was the testimony of two psychology
experts. 9  The first expert, Dr. Bernice Marcopulos, a Ph.D. in
Neuropsychology, testified to Pritchett's mental capacity. 0 It was her opinion
that Pritchett was mildly mentally retarded with an IQ of 69, functioning at the
level of a seven-year-old and in the bottom two percent of the population.21 The
second expert, Dr. Stephen Herrick, a forensic psychologist, testified about the
functioning of a person like Pritchett.22 His testimonydescribed the susceptibil-
ity of mentally retarded individuals to complywith authority figures and specifi-
callyPritchett's high level of interrogative suggestibility.2 Both Dr. lierrick and
Dr. Marcopulos testified that Pritchett had limited communication skills
2 4
The primaryissue with which the court dealt was whether the experts were
testifying to the truth of Pritchett's in court testimony or, instead, providing
information about mental retardation to the jury which the jury could use to
determine the reliability to give Pritchett's confession." The result in this case
turns largely on characterization. This idea is evidenced bythe Supreme Court
of Virginia's statement that Dr. Herrick's testimony could be construed as "an
inadmissible statement regarding Pritchett's veracity."26 Therefore, the practitio-
ner must pay close attention to the wayin which he characterizes evidence. The
evidence must be construed as evidence going to the reliabilityof the defendant's
confession, but cannot be evidence on the defendant's mental condition at the
time of the crime or evidence going to the credibility of his in court testimony.
The practitioner must be extremely careful, at all stages, to characterize the
evidence in this way.
Second, the testimony of the expert must be carefully tailored to meet this
standard and not cross over the line. "[A]n expert may testify to a witness's or
defendant's mental disorder and the hypothetical effect of that disorder on a
person in the witness's or defendant's situation, so long as the expert does not
opine on the truth of the statement at issue." 7 In this case, both experts testified
about Pritchett's specific mental condition and the effect of this condition on his
communication skills, generallyandunderthe influence of authoritative individu-
als.29 This pon is veryiniportant because if the' eprt testifies in anywayabout
the defedn's veracity, the trial court will exld the testimony and this
19. Id at 207.
20. Id; Appendix at 128, Pri/ (No. 010030).
21. Pnbtr 557 S.E.2d at 207. Appendix at 131, Pritb (No. 010030).
22. pkimm, 557 S.E.2d at 207.
23. Id
24. Id
25. Id at 207-08.
26. Id at 208.
27. Id (citing Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 292 SE.2d 798, 806 (Va. 1982)).
28. Id at 207.
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exclusion is not error." Therefore, counsel must properly prepare the expert's
testimony so that it only covers the appropriate material.
Third, portraying evidence to be something with which jurors have no
outside knowledge that aids the jurors' factual decision will be successful. In
discussing the evidence in this case the court stated that because "it merely
presented information on subjects unfamiliar to the jury that would assist it in
determining thereliabilityof Pritchett's confession... this testimonyshould have
been admitted."10 Most mental conditions are likely out of the jury's knowledge
range and counsel must emphasize this fact when attempting to introduce similar
evidence. The practitioner can also make the argument that even if the mental
condition is not completely foreign to the jury, the jury may be unfamiliar with
the effect of the condition in certain hypothetical situations. Thus, again, charac-
terization is key.
This case also highlights the uses of appointed mental experts. Defense
counsel not onlyused appointed psychIologicalexperts for mitigation during the
sentencing phase, but in the guilt phase of the trial." Under Virginia Code
Section 19.2-264.3:1, a defendant is entitled to appointment of an expert to
evaluate his mental condition for relevant issues in sentencing.32 The statute does
not say whether the experts may testify during the guilt phase on mental issues
other than sanity, but neither does the statute prohibit such testimony." There-
fore, if defense counsel succeeds in having an expert appointed, the practitioner
should evaluate whether the expert may also be valuable to guilt phase issues
such as confessions.
IV. CQndwion
This case illustrates several important points regarding the use of mental
experts. First, a mental expert can be valuable both in the sentencing and guilt
phases. Second, this expert testimony can be used for a greater array of issues
than justsanity, as here where it could have persuaded the jurors that the defen-
dant may have falsely confessed. To achieve these objectives counsel must be
painstakingly careful in three ways: (1) always characterize the evidence as
testimony about the reliability of the defendant's statement; (2) ensure that the
witness onlytestifies about the defendant's condition and the hypothetical effect
of that condition; and (3) make the testimony a valuable aid to the juy Lastly,
defense counsel in this case did everything correctlyto aid his client and preserve
error for review.
Katuyn Roe Eldridge
29. Id at 208.
30. Id
31. Id at 207.
32. VA. CODE ANN. S 192-264.3:1(A) (Nfichie 2000) (oudining procedure for appointment
of a mental health expert).
33. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.3:1(E) (Micbi 2000) (oudlining procedure for defense to
notice the Commonwealth of intent to use "an expert witness to support a claim in mitigation').
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